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82 11. 2d 471, 413 N.E.2d 370 (1980)
The Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act' imposes a tax upon
the privilege of engaging in the occupation of selling2 tangible personal
property at retail3 at the rate of two to four percent of the retailer's
gross receipts from such retail sales.4 The tax was declared constitu-
tional under the Revenue Article of the Illinois Constitution 5 in 1933.6
1. Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440-453 (1979 & Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter referred to as the Act]. See generally Ice, The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act and Re-
lated Tax Laws, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 614 [hereinafter referred to as Ice].
2. The tax is not upon the sale as such, but on the taxpayer's occupation of making sales to
users or consumers. Central Television Service Inc. v. Isaacs, 27 Ill. 2d 420, 426-27, 189 N.E.2d
333, 336 (1963).
3. A retail sale is defined as one to the ultimate consumer, ie., the person who will use or
consume the item or otherwise remove the item from the retail market. See text accompanying
notes 26-29 and 55-61, infra.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441 (1979 & Supp. 1981) was amended to lower the State
Retailers' Occupation Tax rate on retail sales of food and medicine from 4% to 3% as of January 1,
1980; the statute was further amended to lower the rate to 2% effective January 1, 1981. The
Municipal Retailers' Occupation Tax, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 8-11-1 (1981), and the County
Retailers' Occupation Tax, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 409.1 (1981), permit a municipality or county
to impose a tax on a taxpayer of up to 1% of the taxpayer's gross receipts from retail sales. These
taxes are mutually exclusive. In addition, the Regional Transportation Authority (R.T.A.) and
Metro East Transportation Authority are empowered to impose a /% to 1% tax on the gross
receipts of retailers within their boundaries. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11136, § 704.03e (1981). This
translates generally into a total tax on non-food and non-medicine items of 6% in Cook County,
54% in the remainder of the R.T.A. District and in the Metro East District, and 5% throughout the
rest of the state. On food and medicine, the rates are 4%, 3 /% and 3% respectively.
5. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, §§ 1-2 provided:
SECTION 1.
The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax,
by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person or per-
sons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct,
and not otherwise; but the General Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auction-
eers, brokers, hawkers, merchants, commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, inn-keep-
ers, grocery-keepers, liquor dealers, toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and express
interests or businesses, vendors of patents, and persons or corporations owning or using
franchises and privileges, in such manner as it shall, from time to time, direct by general
law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates.
SECTION 2.
The specifications of the objects and subjects of taxation shall not deprive the General
Assembly of the power to require other subjects to be taxed, in such manner as may be
consistent with the principles of taxation fixed in this Constitution.
The new constitution provides:
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However, due to its importance7 and the difficulties of its application, it
has continued to be the subject of considerable litigation.8 Much of the
litigation arising from the Act has concerned whether sales made by a
taxpayer have been taxable as "sales at retail." The Act defines a "sale
at retail" as any transfer for a valuable consideration of tangible per-
sonal property for the purchaser's "use or consumption" and not for
the purpose of resale.9 The construction of the term "sale at retail," i e.,
the taxable event, therefore, is aligned very closely with the meaning of
"use or consumption."
The latest in a series of Illinois Supreme Court cases attempting to
interpret the term "use or consumption," as used in this definition, is
Dearborn Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Whitler.10 In this case, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District and the Illinois Supreme Court
dealt with the effect of a pair of 1965 amendments to the Act.1  The
amendments require a seller to obtain a certificate of resale' 2 from his
purchaser in order to support a deduction from gross receipts on the
basis that sales to that purchaser were not for use or consumption, but
SECTION 1. STATE REVENUE POWER
The General Assembly has the exclusive power to raise revenue by law except as limited
or otherwise provided in this Constitution. The power of taxation shall not be surren-
dered, suspended, or contracted away.
SECTION 2. NON-PROPERTY TAXES-CLASSIFICATION, EXEMPTIONS, DE-
DUCTIONS, ALLOWANCES AND CREDITS
In any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes, or fees, the classes
shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed uni-
formly. Exemptions, deductions, credits, refunds and other allowances shall be
reasonable.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2 (1970).
6. Reif v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 104, 188 N.E. 889 (1933), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969).
7. In 1980, sales tax revenue accounted for over 33% of the total tax collections in Illinois.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX REVENUE,
OCT.-DEC. (1980).
8. This author has located over fifty cases which have been decided in the Illinois Supreme
Court and appellate courts concerning the Retailers' Occupation Tax since 1957.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
10. 82 Ill. 2d 471, 413 N.E.2d 370 (1980).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440, 441 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
12. The Illinois Department of Revenue has promulgated Retailers' Occupation Tax Articles
and Rules as regulations pursuant to the power granted to it by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 451
(1979 & Supp. 1981). Article 13 in pertinent part provides:
(2) A Certificate of Resale is a statement signed by the purchaser that the property
purchased by him is purchased for purposes of resale.
(3) A Certificate of Resale must bear the seller's name and address, the name and ad-
dress of the purchaser, the date when such certificate was signed by the purchaser, a
sufficient identification of the property sold for resale to the purchaser, and the
purchaser's registration number or resale number with the Department.
Id. at 58.
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were for resale. 13 In Dearborn, the appellate court held that the re-
quirements of the statute' 4 were clear, and that without compliance
with the statute the taxpayer could not benefit from the statutory ex-
emption.' 5 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that
the provisions concerning resale certificates apply only to retailers and
that the taxpayer, a wholesaler, was not required to comply.'
6
This comment will first examine the Illinois Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Dearborn in the context of both the appellate court's interpreta-
tion of the case and previous Illinois Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the sale at retail (and, therefore, use or consumption) pro-
visions of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act. This comment will then
question the supreme court's determination that the 1965 amendments
requiring resale certificates' 7 do not apply to 100 percent wholesalers' 8
13. The amendments, codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440, 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981),
in pertinent part provide:
"Sale at retail" shall be construed to include any transfer of the ownership of or title
to tangible personal property to a purchaser, for the use or consumption by any other
person to whom such purchaser may transfer the tangible personal property without a
valuable consideration, and to include any transfer, whether madefor or without valuable
consideration, for resale in anyform as tangible-personal property, unless made in compli-
ance with Section 2c of this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1979 & Supp. 1981) (emphasis added to denote the amended
portion).
If the purchaser is not registered with the Department as a taxpayer, but claims to be a
reseller of the tangible personal property in such a way that such resales are not taxable
under this Act or under some other tax law which the Department may administer, such
purchaser. . . shall apply to the Department for a resale number. Such applicant shall
state facts which will show the Department why such applicant is not liable for tax under
this Act or under some other tax law which the Department may administer on any of
his resales and shall furnish such additional information as the Department may reason-
ably require.
Upon approval of the application, the Department shall assign a resale number to
the applicant and shall certify such number to him. The Department may cancel any
such number which is obtained through misrepresentation, or which is used to make a
purchase tax-free when the purchase in fact is not a purchase for resale, or which no
longer applies because of the purchaser's having discontinued the making of tax exempt
resales of the property.
The Department may restrict the use of the number to one year at a time or to some
other definite period if the Department finds it impracticable or otherwise inadvisable to
issue such numbers for indefinite periods.
Except as provided hereinabove in this Section, no sale shall be made tax-free on
the ground of being a sale for resale unless the purchaser has an active registration
number or resale number from the Department and furnishes that number to the seller
in connection with certifying to the seller that any sale to such purchaser is nontaxable
because of being a sale for resale.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981).
14. In order for a sale to be considered exempt, the statute requires a purchaser claiming to
be a reseller to obtain a registration number or resale number and to supply such number to his
vendor in conjunction with certifying that he will resell the property purchased. Id. at §§ 440,
441c.
15. 74 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815, 393 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1979).
16. 82 Ill. 2d at 477, 413 N.E.2d at 372-73.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440, 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981).
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in light of the original objectives of the Act. A taxable "sale at retail"
originally was considered to be only a sale to the ultimate user.' 9 The
1965 amendments have expanded taxable sales to include all sales not
documented as exempt. 20 Finally, this comment will conclude that
since a change in the definition of a taxable sale necessarily alters the
content of the category of sellers at retail who are subject to the tax,
sellers who do not obey the statutory mandate are sellers at retail and
should be taxed on their undocumented sales.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Retailers' Occupation Tax Act
The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act was enacted in 1933 to replace
property tax revenue which had been reduced as a result of the Depres-
sion.2' The tax is imposed upon the privilege of doing business in Illi-
nois as a retailer of tangible personal property, 22 and is measured by
such sellers' gross receipts from sales at retail.23 The term "retailer" is
defined by statute,24 not by common usage. Therefore, a person whose
general occupation is that of a manufacturer or "wholesaler" may also
be considered to be a retailer if he engages in the occupation of selling
tangible personal property under the circumstances defined in the Re-
tailers' Occupation Tax Act.25 In Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 26
the operators of a coal mine were held to be sellers at retail despite
their assertion that they were producers, not retailers, of tangible per-
sonal property.27 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the taxpayer,
Franklin, did sell a large part of its output of coal to consumers.
28
Since the taxable event under the Act was the sale of tangible personal
property to a user or consumer, the court concluded that Franklin had
18. The statute and regulations deal with sellers in the categories of sellers at retail and sellers
for resale. A 100% wholesaler in statutory terms would be a seller who always sold for resale. Id.
at § 440.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1933). See also Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359
Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934).
20. In addition to the exemption for sales made for resale, the Act also exempts sales to
charitable, religious or educational organizations, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441 (1979 & Supp.
1981), and sales of pollution control equipment. Id. at § 440a.
21. Ice, supra note 1, at 614.
22. The tax applies only to sales of tangible personal property. Sales of intangibles and of
real property are exempt.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
24. Id. at § 440.
25. Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 178, 186, 194 N.E. 268, 271 (1934).
26. 359 Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934).
27. Id. at 182-83, 194 N.E. at 270.
28. Id. at 182, 194 N.E. at 270.
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made taxable retail sales. 29
The earliest Illinois Supreme Court case seeking to interpret the
term "sale at retail" 30 held that a retail sale was one made to the user or
consumer of the tangible personal property. 3' Furthermore, "[tihe user
or consumer contemplated by the statute is the ultimate user or con-
sumer who will use the articles as long as they last or until he desires to
do away with them. ' 32 However, until the 1965 amendments, there
was no rule requiring that a taxpayer document that any given sale was
not to the ultimate user or consumer in order to take a deduction from
his gross receipts when computing his tax liability.33
In 1943, the Illinois Supreme Court examined the validity of a De-
partment of Finance policy of disallowing deductions taken without
obtaining resale certificates 34 in Fashion-Bilt Cloak Manufacturing Co.
v. Department of Finance.35 The taxpayer in Fashion-Bilt was a busi-
ness whose sales were approximately eighty-five percent for resale
(wholesale) and fifteen percent retail, the retail sales being merely an
accommodation to employees, friends and relatives of the owners. The
wholesale sales were all credit transactions and the retail sales were
cash sales. Because the company originally did not obtain resale certif-
icates from any of its customers, the auditor for the Department of Fi-
nance treated the entire gross sales as retail sales, excepting only certain
piece goods and those sales for which the taxpayer subsequently was
able to produce resale certificates. The auditor made no effort to deter-
mine whether the sales were in fact retail in nature. 36
Based upon the auditor's findings, the Department of Finance is-
sued a notice of tax liability for the amount of sales not exempted by
resale certificates, to which the taxpayer registered a timely protest.37
29. Id. at 185, 194 N.E. at 271.
30. The Act, in its original form, in pertinent part provided:
" 'Sale at retail' means any transfer of the ownership of, or title to, tangible personal
property to the purchaser, for use or consumption and not for resale in any form as
tangible personal property, for a valuable consideration."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1937).
31. Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 I11. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934). See also Ice, supra
note 1, at 619-20.
32. Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 IUI. 180, 185, 18 N.E.2d 219, 222 (1938).
33. Fashion-Bilt Cloak Mfg. Co. v. Department of Finance, 383 IIn. 253, 258, 49 N.E.2d 41,
43 (1943).
34. There was no rule requiring resale certificates, only a Departmental policy of denying
exemptions which were not supported by resale certificates. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
35. 383 Ill. 253, 49 N.E.2d 41 (1943).
36. Id. at 256, 49 N.E.2d at 42.
37. After examination of a taxpayer's return, if the tax computed is greater than the amount
due under the return, the Department will issue a notice of tax liability for the amount claimed to
be due under the auditor's corrected return. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 443 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
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At the hearing before the Department, the taxpayer did not produce
any additional resale certificates; thus, his evidence was ruled insuffi-
cient to rebut the Department's prima facie case. 38 The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, held that the evidence produced by Fashion-
Bilt, i e., invoices for all "wholesale" sales, and testimony that all retail
sales appeared in the taxpayer's records and that the tax had been paid
on all such receipts, was ample to overcome the prima facie case made
by the Department.39 The court stated that despite the weight accorded
to the Department's corrected returns, where the taxpayer's evidence is
"'not so inconsistent or improbable, in itself, as to be unworthy of be-
lief,'" the Department's prima facie case is overcome and the burden
of proof is shifted to the Department. 4°
The court noted that the taypayer, Fashion-Bilt, had kept and
made available a fairly complete set of books and records and that,
consequently, the only complaint made by the Department concerned
the lack of resale certificates. However, the court stated that certificates
were not required by any direct statutory provision or any rule promul-
gated by the Department. 4' The court held that since the statute con-
tained no sort of certificate requirement, the taxpayer need not obtain
or retain certificates of resale. 42 Therefore, as of 1943, a taxable retail
sale occurred when a person either sold an item of tangible personal
property to its ultimate consumer or sold an item to a reseller but could
not document the exempt nature of the transfer.
Because at that time only sales to ultimate users or consumers were
deemed taxable, sales to persons engaged in service occupations, 43 such
as jewelry repairmen, shoemakers, optometrists and doctors, presented
a special problem. Under the Act, sales to such servicemen were held
exempt from tax since they were sales for resale,44 while the service-
A taxpayer may, within 20 days of receipt of notice of tax liability, protest such liability and
request a hearing before the Department. Id.
38. 383 Ill. at 257, 49 N.E.2d at 43.
39. Id. at 259, 49 N.E.2d at 44.
40. Id. at 257, 49 N.E.2d at 43, quoting Feldstein v. Department of Finance, 377 Ill. 396, 399,
36 N.E.2d 557, 558 (1941).
41. 383 Ill. at 258, 49 N.E.2d at 43. Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Article 8 required only
that a taxpayer retain, in addition to his usual records, such information as was necessary to
substantiate his return, specifically (1) a daily record of gross sales, (2) a daily record of the
amount of merchandise purchased, and (3) a complete annual inventory of stock on hand. Id.
42. 383 Ill. at 258, 49 N.E.2d at 43.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1941).
44. Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 180, 18 N.E.2d 219 (1938). See also American Optical Co.
v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 627, 19 N.E.2d 582 (1939); Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 162, 194
N.E. 272 (1934).
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men's transfers were exempt as incidental to the sale of a service.45 In
1941, the Illinois legislature responded to this interpretation of the stat-
ute by amending the statutory definition of "use or consumption" to
include sales to the ultimate consumer by persons engaged in service
occupations. 46 Three years later in Stoke Lumber Co. v. Stratton,47 the
Illinois Supreme Court held this amendment to be an unconstitutional
attempt to extend the tax to a class of persons not included in the origi-
nal title. The amendment provided that "in addition to its usual and
popular meaning," 48 use or consumption would include situations
wherein a person engaged in a service occupation transferred tangible
personal property as an incident to the sale of his service.49 The Illinois
Supreme Court stated that the amendment contravened the Illinois
Constitution by "creating a second subject matter within the act, not
expressed in the title and inconsistent therewith. '50 The use or con-
sumption referred to in the Act was said to be that of thepurchaser, and
not of someone in privity with the purchaser, so that the serviceman's
purchase could not be taxed since he would not use or consume the
tangible personal property.51 Further, the court stated that the amend-
ment was directly contradictory to the Act because there was another
provision in the statute which excluded from the definition of taxable
sales at retail any sales made "for resale in any form as tangible per-
sonal property, for a valuable consideration." 52 The court, noting this
provision, held that "the transfer of property from the contractor to the
owner contemplated in the amendment, is clearly a transfer in some
form for a valuable consideration, a53 which is therefore an exempt sale
for resale.54
At the same time that this amendment was legislated, the General
45. Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. at 185, 18 N.E.2d at 222-23 (1938).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1941).
47. 386 Ill. 334, 344, 54 N.E.2d 554, 558-59 (1944), overruled, Modem Dairy Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E.2d 8 (1952). In Stoze the taxpayer sold building materials
and fixtures to construction contractors who would incorporate such items into buildings, thereby
converting them into part of the real estate sold. The contractors were not themselves the users of
the tangible personal property; the buyers of the real estate were the users.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1941).
49. Id.
50. 386 Ill. at 337-38, 54 N.E.2d at 556. The Illinois Constitution prohibits dual subject mat-
ter within a statute. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
51. 386 Ill. at 343, 54 N.E.2d at 558.
52. Id. at 339, 54 N.E.2d at 556 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1941)).
53. 386 Ill. at 340, 54 N.E.2d at 557.
54. It should be noted that there is some discrepancy between the phrase used in the statute
(for resale in any form as tangiblepersonalproperty) and the language of the court (a transfer in
someform). The amendment was not as contradictory as the court in Stolze claimed. In fact, the
items in this case were transferred in the form of real property.
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Assembly amended the definition of "sale at retail" to embrace a sale to
a person who will transfer the property to another without a valuable
consideration." This amendment was upheld in Modern Dairy Co. v.
Department of Revenue ,56 where the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the amendment was intended by the legislature to tax the use or con-
sumption which takes the tangible personal property off the retail mar-
ket where it can no longer be an object- of the tax.
57
In Modern Dairy, the court stated that once legislative intent is
ascertained, it should be given effect unless clearly unconstitutional.
58
The court reasoned that the General Assembly intended the amend-
ment to correct the court's prior stilted interpretation of the term "user
or consumer,"5 9 which had indicated that the purchaser was the user or
consumer when he clearly was not. Thus, the legislature amended the
Act to tax the sale to a purchaser who would not himself use the item,
but who would transfer the item to another without a valuable consid-
eration and, therefore, without charging Retailers' Occupation Tax.
60
Writing for the majority in Modern Dairy, Justice Maxwell concluded
that the physical consumption of the property was thereby made irrele-
vant. In his view, the legislature had intended that the term "use or
consumption" encompass the employment of the tangible personal
property which takes it off the retail market, freeing it from further
taxation.
6'
In G. S. Lyon & Sons Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Department
of Revenue,62 the Illinois Supreme Court applied the Modern Dairy
55. The amendment provided: "'Sale at retail' shall be construed to include any transfer of
the ownership of, or title to, tangible personal property to a purchaser, for use or consumption by
any other person to whom such person may transfer the tangible personal property without a
valuable consideration."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1941).
56. 413 I11. 55, 108 N.E.2d 8 (1952). The taxpayer in Modern Dairy sold dairy food products
at retail and for resale. Among its customers was the Chicago State Hospital which purchased
milk to be consumed by its patients and employees. The patients and employees did not pay
consideration for the milk. ld.
57. Id. See also Fefferman v. Marohn, 408 Ill. 542, 97 N.E.2d 785, (1951), wherein the court
did not pass on the constitutionality of the amendment but held that "a sale is one for use and
consumption and not for resale, even though the purchaser transfers the commodity purchased,
provided he does not transfer it for a direct and specific consideration." Id. at 547, 97 N.E.2d at
788.
58. 413 I11. at 66, 108 N.E.2d at 14.
59. Id. at 66-67, 108 N.E.2d at 14-15.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1979 & Supp. 1981) was amended to read: "'Sale at
retail' shall be construed to include any transfer of the ownership of or title to tangible personal
property to a purchaser, for use or consumption by any other person to whom such purchaser may
transfer the tangible personal property without a valuable consideration."
61. 413 Ill. at 66, 108 N.E.2d at 14-15.
62. 23 Ill. 2d 180, 177 N.E.2d 316 (1961).
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analysis to tax sales to a construction contractor. 63 In G.S Lyon, the
court ruled that the contractor/purchaser's transformation of the tangi-
blepersonalproperty he purchased into the real estate he sold" effec-
tively removed the tangible personal property from the retail market.
Thus, the taxpayer's act of destroying the identity of the material as
tangible personal property in effect consumed the property within the
meaning of the statute.65 This case permitted the result sought by the
legislature in its amendments, which were ruled unconstitutional in the
Stolze case.66 Thus, as of 1961, a taxable sale occurred when a person
engaged in the occupation of retailing made a sale 1) to the actual ulti-
mate consumer, 2) to a reseller, without any evidence that the sale was
for resale, or 3) to any person whose use of the tangible personal prop-
erty would take it off the retail market, e.g., a person making a gift of
the property or incorporating it into real estate.
In 1965, the legislature attempted to modify the second type of
taxable sale-a sale for resale without documentation-by amending
the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act. The amendment provided that a
"sale at retail" was "any transfer, whether made for or without a valua-
ble consideration, for resale in any form as tangible personal property
unless made in compliance with Section 2c."' 67 Section 2c, in turn, re-
quires that "no sale shall be made tax free on the ground of being a sale
for resale unless the purchaser has an active registration number from
the Department [of Revenue] and furnishes that number to the seller in
connection with certifying to the seller that any sale to such purchaser
is nontaxable because of being a sale for resale."
68
Under the Act as amended, all sales of tangible personal property
are subject to tax unless the contrary is proven by the taxpayer. 69 Ac-
cording to section 7 of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act,70 where a
63. Id. at 66-67, 108 N.E.2d at 15. The Department of Revenue took this holding as an
invitation to tax all sales to servicemen who would retransfer property as an incident to the sale of
a service. It changed its rules and regulations to tax such sales, effective December 13, 1952. The
Illinois Supreme Court overruled this action in Burrows Co. v. Hollingsworth, 415 I11. 202, 112
N.E.2d 706 (1953). See Ice, supra note 1, at 621.
64. The lumber company sold materials to real estate developers who converted the items
into real estate by incorporating them into buildings.
65. 23 11. 2d at 184, 177 N.E.2d at 318-19.
66. See text accompanying notes 46-54 supra.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
68. Id. at § 44 1c. Prior to Dearborn, these amendments had not been interpreted by the
Illinois Supreme Court. In an earlier attempt to raise these issues, the taxpayer had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies and, therefore, his appeal was dismissed. Calderwood Corp.
v. Mahin, 57 Ill. 2d 216, 311 N.E.2d 691 (1974).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 446 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
70. Id.
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taxpayer, on his return, deducts the receipts of nontaxable sales, he
shall maintain books and records to support the reason for tax exemp-
tion.7' Such documents shall be made available for inspection by the
Department of Revenue during regular business hours.72 Among the
books and records which must be maintained by a taxpayer if he claims
a tax exempt sale for resale is "a record of the purchaser's registration
number or resale number with the Department.
'73
The Illinois Supreme Court indicated which records are necessary
to prove exemption from tax in Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue.
74
The court noted that section 7 is explicit in its requirement that docu-
mentary evidence be maintained. 75 Observing that the court had long
held that statutory record-keeping requirements are mandatory, Justice
Schaefer ruled that only the records specified in the Act would suffice
as the minimum required to overcome the Department's prima facie
case.
7 6
In Copilevitz, the taxpayer was a retail grocer who deducted from
his gross recipts the proceeds from interstate sales and sales for resale
made to relatives in Missouri. The Department assessed a tax defi-
ciency based on the taxpayer's unreported sales for which there was no
documentation of exemption.77 The hearing officer allowed the tax-
payer additional time to submit verification of the exempt nature of the
sales; however, the taxpayer did not produce such documentation.
78
Oral testimony was presented in Copilevitz by the taxpayer and his
brother to the effect that the unreported receipts were the result of in-
terstate sales and sales for resale. This evidence was ruled insufficient
71. Id. The Act in pertinent part provides:
To support deductions made on the tax return form, or authorized under this Act, on
account of receipts from. . . sales of tangible personal property for resale,. . . entries in
any books, records or other pertinent papers or documents of the taxpayer in relation
thereto shall be in detail sufficient to show the name and address of the taxpayer's cus-
tomer in each such transaction, . . . the amount of receipts realized from every such
transaction and such other information as may be necessary to establish the nontaxable
character of such transaction under this Act.
72. The Act states: "Books and records ... shall be preserved until the expiration of such
period [in which the Department is authorized to audit] unless the Department, in writing, shall
authorize their destruction or disposal prior to such expiration." Id. A notice of tax liability may
not be issued after January 1 or July 1 to cover more than three years prior to such January 1 or
July 1. Therefore, the period in which an audit may be conducted and during which the taxpayer
must retain his records, is approximately three years. Id. at § 443.
73. Id. at § 446.
74. 41 11. 2d 154, 242 N.E.2d 205 (1968). The court did not consider § 2c in this opinion.
75. Id. at 156, 242 N.E.2d at 206-07. See also Du Page Liquor Store, Inc. v. McKibbin, 383
Ill. 276, 279, 48 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1943).
76. 41 111. 2d at 156-57, 242 N.E.2d at 207.
77. Id. at 155, 242 N.E.2d at 206.
78. Id.
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because section 7 of the Act required retailers to keep documentary
evidence such as books and records of all sales, copies of bills of sale,
and other pertinent papers and documents. The court also noted that,
specifically in relation to sales for resale and interstate sales, the statute
provided that entries describing these sales "shall be in detail sufficient
to show the name and address of each purchaser to whom a sale is
made, the character of every such transaction (whether it is a sale for
resale, (or) a sale in interstate commerce * * *), the date of every such
transaction and the amount of receipts realized from every such trans-
action."' 79 Finally, the court observed that the Department's regula-
tions stated that sellers should "for their protection" take a resale
certificate from their purchasers for resale,80 and that interstate sales
should be documented by a waybill, a Post Office receipt, or a trip sheet
as well as other supporting data as required by section 7.81 Copilevitz
argued that as a small businessman he should not be required to main-
tain a complicated set of records. However, he had produced adequate
documentation to support his other exempt sales. Under these facts,
the court held that the Department's case had not been overcome.
82
In summary, the major cases interpreting the Retailers' Occupa-
tion Tax Act's use or consumption provision, 83 which closely deter-
mines the occasion of a taxable retail sale, have established that a
taxable sale occurs under the following circumstances: 1) when the tax-
payer makes a sale to the ultimate user or consumer of the item;
2) when the taxpayer is unable to produce proof that the sale was for
resale (or otherwise exempt) with the records required by section 7 of
the Act; and 3) when the taxpayer sells to a purchaser who will transfer
the property without receiving a valuable consideration (whose
purchase takes the article off the retail market, so it can no longer be
taxed). In 1965, the legislature added a fourth class of retail sale. Ac-
cording to the 1965 amendments, 84 when a taxpayer sells to a purchaser
who does not supply him with a resale certificate, the sale is considered
taxable. Furthermore, section 7 of the Act requires that records sup-
79. Id. at 157, 242 N.E.2d at 207, Citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 446 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
80. Id., citing Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Article 13, rules 2 & 3.
81. 41 Ill. 2d at 157, 242 N.E.2d at 207, citing Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Article 5.
The Copilevitz court did not discuss the statutory requirement of resale certificates found in § 2c.
82. 41 Ill. 2d at 158, 242 N.E.2d at 207,
83. See Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue, 41 Ill. 2d 154, 242 N.E.2d 205 (1968); Modern
Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 II. 55, 108 N.E.2d 28 (1952); Fashion-Bilt Cloak Mfg.
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 383 Il. 253, 49 N.E.2d 41 (1943); Franklin County Coal Co. v.
Ames, 359 Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934).
84. 1965 ILL. LAWS p. 116 amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440, 441c (1979 & Supp.
1981).
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porting a nontaxable sale must be retained by the taxpayer for the stat-
utory period. It was in the context of these cases and statutes that the
Dearborn case arose.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Dearborn Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Whitler
In 1975, the Department of Revenue conducted a field audit
85 of
Dearborn Wholesale Grocers, Inc. Dearborn was an establishment
which sold large quantities of grocery items to both restaurants and
retail grocers on a wholesale basis.8 6 The audit covered the period
from July 1, 1972 through May 31, 1975. The auditor selected the third
ten days of January 1972, the second ten days of May 1973 and the first
ten days of August 1974 for review, as authorized by the taxpayer.
8 7
From examination of the taxpayer's invoices for these periods, the
auditor determined Dearborn's gross receipts for a typical month. Ex-
tending this figure to cover the 36 month period of the audit, the audi-
tor established Dearborn's gross receipts. Deductions for sales for
resale88 were allowed for approximately ninety-eight and one-half per-
cent of this amount, the balance being treated as taxable sales. The
Department assessed a tax liability 9 of $128,977.37 on this basis.90
Dearborn entered a timely protest and was granted a hearing to contest
the assessment.9'
At the taxpayer's hearing, the Department properly introduced its
corrected returns and established its prima facie case. The taxpayer
presented the testimony of its president, several salesmen and a truck
driver that all sales and deliveries were to retail grocery stores.92 Dear-
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 443 (1979 & Supp. 1981) declares that the Department of
Revenue shall examine and, if necessary, correct the tax returns submitted by retailers. An audi-
tor may go to the taxpayer's premises and examine the books and records required to be kept by
the Act which support the taxpayer's returns (a field audit), or he may request the books and
records of the taxpayer and conduct the audit at the Department (an office audit). Id. at §§ 446-
47.
86. Dearborn Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Whitler, 74 Il. App. 3d 813, 814, 393 N.E.2d 1, 2
(1979).
87. Matt White, Vice President of Dearborn, signed an agreement authorizing a test check
audit on January 6, 1975. This agreement is reproduced as Appendix "A" in Brief for Appellee at
la-2a, Dearborn Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Whitler, 82 Ill. 2d 471, 413 N.E.2d 370 (1980).
88. Dearborn had obtained self styled consumer information sheets for at least some of the
undocumented sales. 74 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817, 393 N.E.2d 1, 4.
89. See note 37 supra.
90. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 814, 393 N.E.2d at 2.
91. See note 37 supra.
92. 82 Ill. 2d at 473-74, 413 N.E.2d at 371. Upon being questioned as to whether he had
secured registration numbers from customers, the truck driver testified that having the numbers
was "not a must." Id. at 471, 413 N.E.2d at 370.
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born also submitted all of the invoices from the test check, photographs
of the locations of the customers named on the invoices and their regis-
tration numbers.
93
The hearing officer found Dearborn to be a wholesaler. 94 None-
theless, referring to Section 2c of the Act,95 he recommended 96 that a
final assessment be issued against the taxpayer, including penalties and
interest compounded through May 31, 1977, because of the taxpayer's
failure to present the necessary resale certificates.97 Dearborn sought
administrative review of the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Cook
County.98 Upon review, the court concurred with the hearing officer's
finding that the taxpayer was a wholesaler, but reversed the assessment,
holding that the requirements of section 2c were not applicable to
Dearborn as a wholesaler. 99
The Appellate Court's Decision
The sole issue on appeal was whether Dearborn's failure to com-
ply with section 2c, the requirement of obtaining resale certificates,
controlled the nature of these sales in light of other evidence presented
by the taxpayer, imposing Retailers' Occupation Tax liability. The ap-
pellate court held that it could. l°
Justice Medja, author of the appellate court's opinion, rejected
Dearborn's contention that the tax did not apply.to it as an exclusively
wholesale business. In his view, a determination of the wholesale-re-
tail' 0 ' question was irrelevant since the real issue was whether there
was compliance with section 2c of the statute, 0 2 which created a deduc-
93. Id.
94. The hearing officer found that the taxpayer was generally engaged as a seller to resellers.
The Illinois Supreme Court had previously held that a taxpayer's general occupation was irrele-
vant when a taxpayer was also engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property to
users or consumers. Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934). See
text accompanying notes 25-29 supra. The finding as to the taxpayer's general occupation may
have seemed irrelevant to the hearing officer, however, the Circuit Court of Cook County relied
upon this finding in reversing the assessment. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981).
96. A hearing officer does not decide the issues in a hearing. Only the Department can issue
a final assessment, pursuant to a hearing. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 443 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
97. 82 Ill. 2d at 474, 413 N.E.2d at 371.
98. The Act provides that a taxpayer may file suit under the Administrative Review Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 264 (1979), to review any final assessment issued by the Department. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 120, §451 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
99. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 814, 393 N.E.2d at 2.
100. Id.
101. Along the lines of the Franklin Coal decision, the common designation for the taxpayer's
calling is immaterial.
102. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 815, 393 N.E.2d at 2.
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tion from gross receipts which was thereby exempted from tax. The
court stated that the statutory requirements for obtaining the benefits of
this exemption were clear, and that absent taxpayer compliance with
these requirements, no exemption could be taken.1
0 3
The court further rejected the taxpayer's argument that the statute
merely created a presumption of taxability which, once overcome,
shifted the burden to the Department. 04 Justice Medja noted that the
legislature had amended the Act to require resale certificates to docu-
ment "sale for resale" deductions from gross receipts after the Supreme
Court in Fashion-Bilt05 had held that, despite having no resale certifi-
cates, a taxpayer could overcome the presumption of taxability.106 In
light of Dearborn's noncompliance with the statute, the appellate court
ordered the Department's final assessment reinstated. 07
In its supplemental opinion of denial of rehearing, 10 8 the court re-
jected the taxpayer's contention that the Act required a taxpayer only
to obtain its vendees' registration numbers or resale numbers. The re-
gistration numbers submitted by the taxpayer provided no certification,
as required by the Act, that the items purchased were for resale."° 9
The Illinois Supreme Court's Decision
Justice Ward's opinion for the Illinois Supreme Court construed
the requirements of the statute pertaining to the securing of resale cer-
tificates as applying only to persons engaged in the business of making
sales at retail. The court held that Dearborn was not engaged in mak-
ing sales at retail" o and that applying the statute to Dearborn would
effectively tax a wholesaler despite uncontroverted evidence that the
sales it had made were for resale.' 1 ' Since taxing wholesalers is outside
the scope of a tax on retailers, the court concluded that such an applica-
tion would be unconstitutional as violative of the prohibition against
dual subject matter."12
The Dearborn court found that the legislature had limited the tax
103. Id. at 815, 393 N.E.2d at 4.
104. Id. at 815-16, 393 N.E.2d at 3.
105. 383 IUl. 253, 49 N.E.2d 41 (1943). See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
106. 74 IlL. App. 3d at 816, 393 N.E.2d at 4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 817, 393 N.E.2d at 4.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981) provides that a sale shall be exempt
as a sale for resale only if the purchaser provides an active registration or resale number in con-
junction with certifying that the item is nontaxable because it is being purchased for resale.
110. 82 IlL. 2d at 477, 413 N.E.2d at 373.
111. Id. at 477-78, 413 N.E.2d at 373.
112. Id. at 478, 413 N.E.2d at 373. See text accompanying notes 46-54 supra.
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to the retail level in order to avoid multiple taxation of a single item," 3
and noted that there was no evidence to suggest that Dearborn's vend-
ees had not paid the tax." 4 The court acknowledged that the require-
ment of a resale certificate provided a means to verify a retailer's claim
that a particular sale is exempt because the purchaser will not himself
use or consume the property. The court presented the example of a
hospital as the purchaser of tangible personal property which will be
used by its patients.' '5 In such a case the hospital would not hold a
registration number since it is not engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property at retail. The court then concluded that the
requirements of section 2c would furnish a means of verifying that the
hospital's purchase was indeed for resale. " 6
Finally, the court held that similar provisions of the Act, such as
section 7 which requires record-keeping"17 and section 3 which requires
the filing of returns" 8 also apply only to persons engaged in the busi-
ness of selling tangible personal property at retail.' 19 Since Dearborn
was held to be a wholesale operation, it was also held to be unencum-
bered by any of the sections calling for documentation of resale
sales. 20
ANALYSIS
The Illinois Supreme Court reached its conclusion that section 2c
was unconstitutional as applied to Dearborn only by ignoring the statu-
tory definition of "sale at retail" and the established rules of statutory
construction. When the legislature amends a statute after a court has
interpreted the statute, it is evidencing dissatisfaction with the court's
interpretation.' 2' The legislature is presumed to have known of the
prior construction of the original act; therefore, when the act, as
amended, is inconsistent with the prior judicial interpretation, the
amendment controls. 22
113. 82 Ill. 2d at 479, 413 N.E.2d 373-74.
114. Id. at 479, 413 N.E.2d at 374.
115. Id. citing inter alia Modem Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 11. 55, 108
N.E.2d 8 (1952).
116. Id. at 479-80, 413 N.E.2d at 374.
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 446 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
118. Id. at §442.
119. 82 11. 2d at 480, 413 N.E.2d at 374.
120. Id.
121. See Modem Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 66, 108 N.E.2d 8, 14
(1952).
122. IA SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 22.35 (4th ed. 1972). See also Modem
Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E.2d 8.
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The Illinois Supreme Court earlier had noted in Modern Dairy
that when the legislature has statutorily defined a term contrary to a
prior judicial construction, "[it] would then seem incumbent upon the
court to reconsider its construction of the act . . . to harmonize the
court's construction with the legislative intent."'123 The court in Fash-
ion-Bilt'24 held that a retailer need not produce resale certificates to
support its deductions for sales for resale because at the time there was
neither a statutory nor a regulatory requirement for the certificates. 25
Fashion-Bilt's sales, made without resale certificates, were held to be
exempt as non-retail sales. However, the "positive rule of law" which
was found lacking in Fashion-Bilt 26 is now a reality, having been sup-
plied by the General Assembly in the form of the 1965 amendments
declaring that a sale which is not documented as exempt is a sale at
retail. In Dearborn, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with an
amendment to the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act which clearly contra-
dicted the court's prior construction of a taxable sale at retail. By hold-
ing the amendments unconstitutional as applied to Dearborn, the court
failed to take its own advice and harmonize its interpretation of the
term sale at retail with the legislative mandate.
The Dearborn court held section 2c inapplicable to the taxpayer
27
because facts other than those required by the statute showed that
Dearborn was not engaged in making retail sales.' 28 It held that the
statute only governs retailers and therefore did not govern wholesalers
such as Dearborn. However, Dearborn's sales may be classified as re-
tail sales under the three classifications previously established by the
Illinois Supreme Court as well as under the 1965 amendments.
These classifications, as presented above, were 1) a sale to the user
or consumer of the tangible personal property; 2) an allegedly exempt
sale which is not documented as such; and 3) a sale to a purchaser who
will not consume the item, but whose use will take the item off the
retail market. The 1965 amendments provide that a sale is at retail
even if made "at wholesale" if the seller does not obtain a resale certifi-
cate as prescribed in section 2c. For the purpose of discussion, the sales
in classes one and three will be grouped together, since they relate to
use or consumption. Also, the sales in class two and those covered by
123. 413 1U. at 66, 108 N.E.2d at 14.
124. 383 1U. 253, 49 N.E.2d 41 (1943). See text accompanying notes 30-40 supra.
125. 383 11. at 258, 49 N.E.2d at 43.
126. Id.
127. 82 IU. 2d at 477, 413 N.E.2d at 373.
128. Id. at 473-74, 413 N.E.2d at 371.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
section 2c will be grouped together, since they relate to the proper doc-
umentation of exempt sales.
In light of earlier Illinois Supreme Court cases construing the term
"use or consumption," Dearborn did make taxable retail sales. Prior to
the Modern Dairy case, the legislature had amended the Act so as to
include in use or consumption the action which took the tangible per-
sonal property off the retail market and freed any later transfers of the
item from the imposition of the tax.129 Therefore, a sale to someone
who would retransfer the tangible personal property without incurring
tax would be a retail sale. When a seller does not obtain a resale certifi-
cate containing the purchaser's registration or resale number, he vio-
lates the provisions of section 2c. Violating section 2c takes the
tangible personal property off the retail market and impairs the Depart-
ment's ability to collect the tax. If the Department is unable to collect
tax from Dearborn's customers, Dearborn's sales to those customers
were at retail since they were the last sales at which tax could be
collected.
While there is no evidence that Dearborn's customers did not re-
mit the necessary tax, the Department of Revenue's enforcement mech-
anism is hindered when it cannot follow up on sales made for resale
without resale certificates. 30 When the Department of Revenue con-
ducts an audit, any "questionable"' 3 1 resale certificates presented by
the taxpayer can trigger an audit of the purchaser. 32 At the very least,
an auditor will check Department records to ensure that the purchaser
129. 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E.2d 8 (1952). See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text.
130. Other jurisdictions have interpreted similar provisions requiring resale certificates. In
State v. Advertiser Co., 337 So. 2d 942, cert. denied 337 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1976), the court held that
the state sales tax did not apply to wholesale sales. However, it noted that the statutory definition
of wholesale "covers a more restricted category of sales than the word denotes in common par-
lance." Id. at 945. The ordinary meaning of wholesale includes all sales to purchasers who will
themselves resell the item, while the statutory meaning is limited to sales made to licensed retail
merchants who are registered to collect and remit the tax on retail sales and who will resell the
goods. The legislature so limited exempt sales to ensure collection of the tax. Where a wholesaler
sells to a retailer who resells the item but does not collect and remit the tax, the wholesaler be-
comes liable for the tax. Id. Maryland and Arkansas also have interpreted similar requirements
for exemption, Ze., that sales be made to licensed retailers. The Maryland case, F. & M. Schaefer
Brewing Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 211,218, 257 A.2d 416, 418 (1969), held that
sales are exempt from tax only when made to licensed retailers. In Arkansas, a sale, to be exempt,
must be made to a purchaser holding a sales tax permit. The Arkansas court in Hervey v. South-
ern Wooden Box, 253 Ark. 290, 486 S.W.2d 65 (1972), held that, while the statute was designed to
prevent double taxation of the same item, "there is a correlative legislative intent that all property
be subjected to the tax at some point in the course of its manufacture and sale to the ultimate
consumer." Id. at 295, 486 S.W.2d at 69.
131. Audit and Collection Bureau Operating Bulletin, Ill. Dep't of Revenue, A-17 Revision,
July 31, 1979. This bulletin provides that a questionable resale certificate is one lacking in reason-
ableness and apparent good faith.
132. Id.
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indeed has an active registration number. 3 3 However, this can only
happen if a resale certificate is available for inspection so that the De-
partment can identify the purchaser for resale. While Dearborn kept
its own records134 which were available for Department inspection, this
is not always the practice of other wholesalers. For example, a whole-
saler could sell on a cash basis, keeping only a cash register tape con-
taining no data about his purchasers. The Department would then
have no means to police the ultimate disposition of the property and
thereby ensure that the proper tax is collected.
The legislature obviously intended that the tax be imposed once 1
3 5
in the sales history of any item of tangible personal property. 136 Dear-
born's sales of tangible personal property without collecting tax, or ob-
taining resale certificates, impairs the Department's ability to monitor
the transfers of the items so that their ultimate taxable sale in Illinois is
properly reported. 37 Its sales are, therefore, the final sales envisioned
by the court in Modern Dairy, 38 and are taxable as retail sales. Since it
has made retail sales, Dearborn is a retailer under the statute and is
subject to the provisions of the Act, despite its common designation as
a wholesaler.
The second set of classifications of retail sales concerns the proper
documentation of exempt sales. The Act provides that all sales of tan-
gible personal property are subject to tax unless the contrary is proven
by the taxpayer, 139 and it dictates the records necessary to prove ex-
emption.' 40 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the record re-
quirements of the Act are mandatory, and that when records are
required, only the records specified in the Act will suffice. ' 4 1 Section 2c
requires documentation, and the form of the documentation is speci-
fied.' 42 Dearborn's failure to obtain the required resale certificates for
133. Id.
134. These records included invoices and consumer information sheets. See note 87 supra.
135. See note 127 supra.
136. Modem Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 IIl. at 67-68, 108 N.E.2d at 15 (1952).
137. Out of state purchasers are exempt from the requirement of supplying resale certificates.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981). Not all sales of tangible personal property to
users or consumers are taxable. See note 20 upra.
138. 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E.2d 28 (1952).
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 446 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
140. Id.
141. Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue, 41 IM. 2d 154, 242 N.E.2d 205 (1968).
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441c (1979 & Supp. 1981). The Act also specifies that sales
shall not be exempt as sales for resale unless the purchaser supplies his resale or registration
number in connection with certifying that he is purchasing the tangible personal property for
resale.
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one and one-half percent of its alleged sales for resale 143 should have
rendered those sales taxable. However, the Illinois Supreme Court
turned its back on its own prior decisions, 44 and held that sales of tan-
gible personal property were exempt despite the lack of statutorily
mandated documentation which the court had earlier held to be the
only means of proving exemption.'
45
The Dearborn court was concerned that denying exemption to
Dearborn, a putative wholesaler, would permit multiple taxation.'46 It
is true that multiple taxation may occur, but multiple taxation is not
forbidden. In addition, the court's statement was "that by limiting the
tax to sales at the retail level the legislature avoided the multiple taxa-
tion which would result if sales at every level of the distributive process
were taxed."' 47 While the legislature did not tax sales at every level, it
did provide in the Act that every retail sale made by a person engaged
in the business of selling at retail is subject to the tax.' 48 Occasionally,
a single item of tangible personal property is sold at retail more than
once, and the Act requires that a tax must be charged each time such
sale meets the statutory definition of a sale at retail. 49
For example, when a lessor of tangible personal property
purchases an item to lease, his supplier incurs tax on the sale because
the act of leasing is considered to be a taxable use. 150 If the lessor
should later sell the tangible personal property for use or consumption,
he would incur tax on his sale as well. The fact that the item was used
is irrelevant; it is still tangible personal property whose sale for use or
consumption is taxable.' 5' The same item has been subjected to the
same form of taxation twice, yet this is not forbidden multiple taxation.
It is a matter of an item being sold twice under the conditions which the
legislature has set forth to determine when a taxable retail sale has
143. Dearborn's sales for resale were only disallowed as to the 1.5% for which it did not obtain
resale certificates. For the vast majority of its sales, Dearborn had obtained resale certificates and
was permitted the deduction from its gross receipts. 82 Ill. 2d at 473, 413 N.E.2d at 371.
144. See Copilevitz v. Department of Revenue, 41 Ill. 2d 154, 242 N.E.2d 205 (1968); Modern
Dairy v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.E.2d 28 (1952); Fashion-Bilt Cloak Mfg. Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 383 Ill. 253, 49 N.E.2d 41 (1943); Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames,
359 Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934).
145. Dearborn Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Whitler, 82 II. 2d 471, 413 N.E.2d 370 (1980).
146. Id. at 479, 413 N.E.2d at 373-74.
147. Id.
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
149. Id. See Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 IWI. 178, 194 N.E. 268 (1934) and text
accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
150. Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Article 14.
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1979 & Supp. 1981). See Howard Worthington Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1132, 421 N.E.2d 1030 (1981).
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taken place. Therefore, when Dearborn sells to its customers without
obtaining resale certificates, it has made taxable sales at retail. If the
purchasers later sell the items to users or consumers, their sales will be
taxable retail sales as well. If Dearborn were concerned that tax may
be collected twice, it could have collected resale certificates, as re-
quired, on all of its sales, rather than on ninety-eight and one-half per-
cent of them.
The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the purpose of section 2c is
to verify the claim of a retailer that a particular sale is exempt because
the purchaser is not himself the ultimate user or consumer of the prop-
erty.1 52 This is an accurate interpretation of the statute. However, as
an example of this type of situation, the court discussed Modern Dairy,
where a hospital purchased property for the use of its patients.15 3 In
such a case, the court suggested that the hospital would not hold a re-
gistration number since it is not engaged in the business of selling prop-
erty at retail. The court then concluded that the section 2c requirement
provided a means of verifying that this sale to the hospital was indeed a
sale for resale. 54 However, there are several problems with this analy-
sis. The initial problem is that the court did not posit whether the hos-
pital would be charging a valuable consideration for the goods
transferred to the patients for their use. If the hospital would not
charge a valuable consideration, then the sale to the hospital would be
a taxable sale at retail under its own Modern Dairy decision, the very
case it cites. In addition, the court would be holding a "non-retailer" to
the requirements of the Act if it held section 2c requirements applicable
to a hospital which was "using" tangible personal property via its pa-
tients. If the hospital would charge a valuable consideration, the hospi-
tal would be making retail sales 55 and would have a registration
number, contrary to the belief of the court. Since the court stated that
resale certificates should provide a means of verifying that the hospi-
tal's purchase was for resale, presumably the hospital would have a
resale or registration number with the Department. Thus, the court
apparently has misinterpreted the requirements and purpose of section
2c.
The final reason presented by the court for refusing to apply the
requirement of a resale certificate to Dearborn was its holding that all
of the sections of the Act apply only to sellers at retail. Since it denied
152. 82 IU. 2d at 479, 413 N.E.2d at 374.
153. 413 I1U. 55, 108 N.E.2d 8.
154. 82 IlI. 2d at 479-80, 413 N.E.2d at 374.
155. 413 11 55, 108 N.E.2d 8.
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that Dearborn was a retailer, it held that none of the recording or re-
porting provisions of the Act applied. 156 The proposition that the Re-
tailers' Occupation Tax Act applies only to retailers is perfectly
acceptable. What the court overlooked is that Dearborn did make re-
tail sales as defined by the Act, and was therefore a retailer to whom all
of the requirements of the Act apply.
The Dearborn court suggested that even if it did accept the con-
struction of the term "sale at retail" to include sales made without re-
sale certificates, the amendments to section 2c would be
unconstitutional as violating the constitutional prohibition against dual
subject matter.157 However, the court has permitted similar legislative
expansion of the term "sale at retail" in earlier cases. For instance, in
Modern Dairy, the court condoned the definition which included sales
to any person who will retransfer tangible personal property to another
person without receiving a valuable consideration. This expansion was
permitted although the statute was entitled "[a]n Act in relation to a tax
upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal
property topurchasersfor use or consumption."'' 58 In Modern Dairy, the
purchaser did not use or consume the tangible personal property; how-
ever, in cases such as Dearborn, the purchaser may ultimately decide to
use or consume the property, with the Department left unable to collect
tax since it has no record of the purchaser's identity.
Another flaw in the Dearborn court's reasoning is that it presumed
that the taxpayer was a wholesaler without providing any test for deter-
mining who fits the class of wholesaler. Dearborn and other sellers are
only required to obtain and produce resale certificates if they are sell-
ing at retail. However, the only way for the Department to determine
on a day-to-day basis that any seller is a retailer is to examine the
seller's sales records which a non-retailer is not required to keep. By
removing the requirement that a seller keep such records and obtain
such certificates, the court is forcing the Department of Revenue to de-
termine whether a seller is making retail sales based only on the seller's
self-serving declarations that all of his sales are for resale, and any
records which the seller may keep.
To lessen the impact of the Dearborn decision, the Department of
Revenue has taken the position that Dearborn is to be strictly construed
as applying only in situations where the seller made no "sales at re-
156. 82 11. at 480, 413 N.E.2d at 374.
157. Id. at 477-78, 413 N.E.2d at 373. See text accompanying notes 46-54 supra.
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (1950) (emphasis added).
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tail."' 159 When auditing a "wholesaler," an auditor now will search for
retail sales which will make the taxpayer subject to the section 2c resale
certificate requirement. 60 The Dearborn decision serves as an incen-
tive for a seller to keep as few records as possible, so as to avoid provid-
ing the information necessary to be proven a retailer and, therefore,
subject to the tax. Since resale exemptions are a major source of de-
ductions from gross receipts,' 6' the ambiguity as to who is governed by
section 2c will seriously complicate the enforcement of what remains of
the tax imposed on retail sales. Unfortunately, the Department of Rev-
enue does not keep records of total amounts in any category of deduc-
tions from gross receipts, 62 but whenever a purported wholesaler is
audited, all of his sales must now be examined in order to determine
whether he must obtain resale certificates under section 2c.
To reduce this ambiguity, the legislature should amend the Act by
adding to section 2c the reasons why a resale certificate is required.
That is, the statute should set forth the fact that the imposition of tax on
the ultimate sale is endangered when a seller is not required to obtain
resale certificates to document his exempt sales. For example, there is
little motivation for a seller to deal only with properly registered retail-
ers who in good faith are purchasing for resale, if the seller is not obli-
gated to obtain resale certificates or pay tax on the sale. Further,
interpretation of the Act by the courts should take into account its leg-
islative purpose. Under such an approach a court would have a more
difficult time narrowly limiting the scope of the statutory definition,
and perhaps all sales declared by the legislature to be sales at retail
could again be taxed.
In sum, while the Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the
Retailers' Occupation Tax applies only to persons engaged in the busi-
159. Interview with Thomas J. Grudichak, Supervisor Regulations Section, Sales and Excise
Tax Legal Division, Chicago Office, October 5, 1981.
The Fourth District Appellate Court examined a situation similar to Dearborn in Illinois
Cereal Mills v. Department of Revenue, 106 Ill. App. 3d 53, 435 N.E.2d 774 (1982). In that case,
the court held that the taxpayer's admitted retail sales, 66% of its gross sales, rendered the taxpayer
subject to all of the provisions of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, including the section 2c
requirement that resale certificates be obtained to justify resale deductions. Id. The dissent ex-
pressed concern lest a single retail sale be permitted to subject a taxpayer to all Retailers' Occupa-
tion Tax requirements. Id.
Agreeing with the Illinois Cereal Mills decision, the First District Appellate Court has held
that the making of some retail sales brings a seller within the coverage of the Retailers' Occupa-
tion Tax Act. Tri-America Oil Company v. Department of Revenue, No. 81-950 (First Dist. July
30, 1982).
160. Interview with Frank Levin, Auditor District 10, Illinois Dep't of Revenue, November
16, 1981.
161. Id.
162. Interview with Thomas McGee, Manager, Revenue Accounting, October 16, 1981.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ness of selling at retail, it failed to implement legislative intent in its
interpretation of "sale at retail." The General Assembly intended to
tax the sale which takes an item of tangible personal property off the
retail market. Dearborn's act of selling tax-free without resale certifi-
cates took tangible personal property off the traceable retail market,
endangering enforcement of tax collection on the ultimate sale. This
removal from the market constituted a taxable retail sale and should
have been deemed so by the court.
The court's fear of permitting multiple taxation is unfounded.
Dearborn could have avoided multiple taxation by obtaining and pro-
ducing resale certificates, which it had done ninety-eight and one-half
percent of the time, for the remaining one and one-half percent of its
sales. It was Dearborn's failure to produce resale certificates for the
remaining one and one-half percent which rendered those taxable as
sales at retail. Dearborn was, therefore, a retailer subject to the Act,
and should not benefit from the statutory exemption when its actions
impair the enforcement of the tax.
CONCLUSION
From its first decisions interpreting the Retailers' Occupation Tax
Act, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that sales meeting the statu-
tory definition are taxable as sales at retail. ' 63 In Fashion-Bilt, the court
held that a taxpayer need not supply a resale certificate only because
the Act did not require one.164 Prior to Dearborn, this requirement was
supplied by the General Assembly by way of an amendment to the
Act. 165 The Modern Dairy decision established a "removal from the
market" test which provided that the last traceable sale of tangible per-
sonal property is subject to tax. 166 Dearborn's sales met this test by
cutting off all record of the sales. And, in Copilevitz, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the statutory record-keeping requirements of
the Act are mandatory. 67
The legislature has clearly established its intent in the 1965
amendments to the Act: the sale of tangible personal property without
obtaining a resale certificate is a taxable retail sale; the person making
such a sale is a retailer and, therefore, subject to the Retailers' Occupa-
tion Tax Act. By failing to obtain its purchaser's registration or resale
163. See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
165. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 440, 441 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
166. See text accompanying notes 55-62 supra.
167. See text accompanying notes 73-81 supra.
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numbers in conjunction with statutorily required resale certificates,
Dearborn removed the primary means of assuring that the tax will ulti-
mately be paid, thereby effectively removing the tangible personal
property from the retail market. Since its actions met the supreme
court's own definition of "use of consumption," Dearborn should have
been held liable for the tax on "sales for resale" for which ist could not
produce resale certificates as required by section 2c.
The court suggested that a construction of the term "sale at retail"
to include sales undocumented by resale certificates would be unconsti-
tutional as violative of the prohibition against dual subject matter.
However, having ruled that physical consumption of the tangible per-
sonal property is irrelevant if the tangible personal property is removed
from the market, the court could have held Dearborn's sales were taxa-
ble because such sales removed tangible personal property from the
traceable retail market. That would have avoided leaving the taxable
status of future sellers dependent upon the sellers' unsubstantial claims
that their sales are for resale. Until resale certificates and records are
required to substantiate the exempt nature of sales for resale, a substan-
tial disincentive is provided to sellers to ensure that their tax-free sales
are made only to registered purchasers who will collect tax on the ulti-
mate sale.
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